The problem of finding a lattice vector approximating a shortest nonzero lattice vector (approximate SVP) is a serious problem that concerns lattices. Finding a lattice vector of the secret key of some lattice-based cryptosystems is equivalent to solving some hard approximate SVP. We call such vectors very short vectors (VSVs). Lattice basis reduction is the main tool for finding VSVs. However, the main lattice basis reduction algorithms cannot find VSVs in lattices in dimensions ∼200 or above. Exhaustive search can be considered to be a key technique toward eliminating the limitations with current lattice basis reduction algorithms. However, known methods of carrying out exhaustive searches can only work in relatively low-dimensional lattices. We defined the extended search space (ESS) and experimentally confirmed that exhaustive searches in ESS make it possible to find VSVs in lattices in dimensions ∼200 or above with the parameters computed from known VSVs. This paper presents an extension of our earlier work. We demonstrate the practical effectiveness of our technique by presenting a method of choosing the parameters without known VSVs. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of distributed searches.
Introduction
An integer lattice, L, is the set of all linear combinations with integer coefficients of a set of linearly independent vectors b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ Z m . The problem of finding a nonzero lattice vector with the shortest length for a given lattice basis has been one of the most widely studied problems concerning lattices. Note that such vectors are not necessarily unique. This problem is called the shortest vector problem (SVP). No polynomial time algorithm for SVP is known for lattices with arbitrary dimensions, and Ajtai proved SVP to be NP-hard under randomized reduction [2] . It is already difficult to determine if a given short lattice vector is a shortest nonzero lattice vector or not. One can at most expect that a given short lattice vector will likely be a shortest nonzero lattice vector with a heuristic threshold for random lattices. Micciancio [14] stated that the lack of efficient algorithms for SVP led compute r scientists to consider approximation versions of it. The approximation problem for SVP is to find a nonzero lattice vector with at most γ-times the minimal possible length for constant γ. This approximation problem is called approximate SVP, and a solution to it is called an approximate shortest vector. When γ is small, approximate SVP is still hard. In fact, Micciancio proved approximate SVP to be NP-hard for γ < √ 2 [15] . In this and our earlier research, we constructed an exhaustive search to solve approximate SVP.
Many lattice basis reduction algorithms for approximate SVP have been proposed in the literature, e.g., the Lenstra, Lenstra, yamaguch@graco.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp and Lovász (LLL) [12] , the block Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) [17] , and the random sampling reduction (RSR) [18] algorithms. They are key tools for attacking lattice-based cryptosystems [1] , [8] , [10] , [14] . The secret key in most lattice-based cryptosystems is a short vector or short vectors in a particular class of lattices. A lattice vector of the secret key is not only short but it also approximates a shortest nonzero lattice vector within a small factor, γ. Consequently, finding a lattice vector of the secret key is a difficult task because this is equivalent to solving some hard approximate SVP. However, lattice basis reduction algorithms occasionally recover the secret key of lattice-based cryptosystems for a given public key in lattices in dimensions above 100. For example, Sc hnorr recovered the secret key by using RSR given the corresponding public key of GGH cryptosystem in lattices in dimension 180 [18] , and Gama and Nguyen broke NTRU cryptosystems in lattices in dimension 214 by using BKZ and some improved reduction [6] . These examples also reveal the limitations with current lattice basis reduction algorithms. Exhaustive searches can be considered to be a key technique to eliminating these limitations. However, Schnorr-Euchner's enumeration [17] , which was the most efficient known method for exhaustive searches before Schnorr [18] and Gama et al. [7] , could only work in lattices in dimensions below 100. Fukase et al. [5] improved the shape of the search space used by Schnorr [18] so that it included a shortest nonzero lattice vector with higher probability.
We must determine if a found lattice vector is a shortest nonzero lattice vector or not to evaluate how well our technique performs. Although this is generally difficult, a shortest nonzero lattice vector is heuristically known in some cryptographic applications. For example, a lattice vector of the secret key in the GGH cryptosystem has been treated as a shortest nonzero lattice c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan vector [18] . Hoffstein et al. [10] showed that the secret key of the NTRU cryptosystem was heuristically a shortest nonzero lattice vector, and Gama et al. [6] stated that the secret key of the NTRU cryptosystem was related to linearly independent shortest vectors. We followed these examples and treated a lattice vector of the secret key in some lattice-based cryptosystems as a shortest nonzero lattice vector. However, to retain rigor in the definition of a shortest nonzero lattice vector, we made a distinction between a lattice vector of the secret key and a sho rtest nonzero lattice vector. Ludwig [13] used the term "a very short vector" to represent a lattice vector of the secret key of an NTRU cryptosystem. A very short vector (VSV) means a lattice vector of the secret key of some lattice-based cryptosystems in the rest of this paper.
This work is a continuation of that by Fukase et al. [4] , [5] . We defined the extended search space (ESS) and experimentally confirmed that the exhaustive search in ESS made it possible to find a VSV in lattices in dimensions ∼200 or above with the parameters computed from known VSVs [5] . This research extends our earlier work so that appropriate parameters for ESS can be determined without known VSVs in practical situations where VSVs are not known. We mean parameters that maximize the inclusion probability of a VSV through appropriate parameters. We utilize the probabilistic distribution of the probabilistic variable related to the Gram-Schmidt coefficients of VSVs to compute the inclusion probability of a VSV, which can be obtained in some cryptographic situations.
We also report experimental results obtained from a distributed search in ESS. It has been pointed out that the search of a lattice vector using a sampling algorithm [18] or its variants can easily be distributed [13] . This is also the case for the search in ESS. We experimentally demonstrated the distributed search in ESS was effective, which is discussed in this paper. This paper makes two main contributions. ( 1 ) We constructed a method of computing the inclusion probability of a VSV in ESS and outputting the refined parameters for ESS to maximize the inclusion probability. We introduced the distribution of a deviation from the estimated values of coefficients of VSVs to compute the inclusion probability. We found that the parameters computed with the method were sufficient to achieve high inclusion ratios for VSVs. ( 2 ) We experimentally confirmed the distributed search in ESS was effective. Significant speedups were achieved on eight CPUs in some small-scale experiments. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains some basic concepts of lattices. We recall the definition of ESS and explain the performance of the search in ESS with the parameters computed from known VSVs in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a scheme to compute the refined parameters for the ESS of a given basis. In Section 5, we report experimental results on the distributed search in ESS. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Work
Extreme pruning [7] has recently been proposed for lattice enumeration. Its analysis is based on the distribution of a shortest nonzero lattice vector, like that with our method. It has achieved exponential speedups for Schnorr-Euchner's enumeration. There are some similarities between our method [4] , [5] and Gama et al. [7] , but the bounding functions and types of lattices that are targeted are very different. Also, the strategy for search is very different. Gama et al. [7] search space size was drastically reduced by pruning the search tree and the searches were conducted many times to compensate for the loss in the success probability caused by pruning the search tree. Our strategy for search, on the other hand, was to reduce the size of the search space sufficiently to enable an efficient search, to simultaneously make the success probability as high as possible, and to basically conduct the search once. Therefore , it seems that each method has different advantages and should be evaluated from slightly different aspects. After Gama et al. [7] , the effectiveness of parallelizing enumeration with multi-core CPUs, GPUs, or cloud-computing was reported [3] , [9] , [11] . This paper reports parallelization was effective with our search method of only using multi-core CPUs. We also intend to parallelize our search method with GPUs or cloud-computing in future work.
Preliminaries

Lattice
Given a set of n linearly independent vectors
We concentrate on fulldimensional integer lattices in this paper. A lattice has infinitely many bases that generate a lattice when n ≥ 2. 
This equation means that for lattice vector v = n j=1 ν j b * j to be short |ν j | for j = 1, . . . , n needs to be small. In the following, we call ν j the Gram-Schmidt coefficients of v.
We denote the length of the shortest nonzero lattice vector in lattice L by λ 1 (L) or λ 1 when L is considered to be obvious.
Lattice Basis Reduction Algorithms
Lattice basis reduction algorithms are key tools for approximate SVP. Several different lattice basis reduction algorithms have been proposed in the literature. The BKZ algorithm [17] computes a (δ, β)-BKZ reduced basis for δ ∈ (1/4, 1] and an integer β such that 2 ≤ β < n. There is no proven polynomial time bound for the BKZ algorithm, but it behaves well for reasonable β. Although the quality of a (δ, β)-BKZ reduced basis is better for larger δ and β, the computational cost increases for larger δ and c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan β.
Schnorr proposed random sampling reduction (RSR) [18] , which is applied to lattice bases whose Gram-Schmidt orthogonalized basis satisfies the geometric series assumption (GSA 
for some 1 ≤ u ≤ n is likely to be short. 
Lattice Based Cryptosystems
We applied our method to three types of lattices that were related to lattice-based cryptosystems in this study.
GGH Cryptosystem
The idea of public key construction in the GGH cryptosystem is that it is hard to find a basis consisting of considerably short vectors from a basis consisting of very long vectors in a lattice. Based on this idea, the private key of the GGH cryptosystem is set to the former and the public key is set to the latter. The private basis, R, is defined as R = kI + R with k ∈ Z. R is a perturbation matrix with entries chosen independently and uniformly at random from {−l, . . . , +l}, and I is the identity matrix. R is transformed into a public basis, B, by applying elementary column operations 2n times. We add a random integer combination of the other columns to a column at every step. The coefficients in the integer combination are chosen at random from {−1, 0, +1}. We call the lattices generated by private bases or public bases in GGH cryptosystems GGH lattices.
Micciancio's GGH Cryptosystem
Micciancio [14] improved the GGH cryptosystem with the HNF technique, where the key and ciphertext sizes were reduced by a factor, n, without decreasing security. Consider a lattice basis, K, whose matrix is uniformly chosen in {−n, . . . , n} n×n .
Micciancio proposed a private basis, R, to be an LLL reduced basis of K. The corresponding public basis is the Hermite normal form of R. A lattice basis, H = (h i, j ) ∈ Z n×n , is said to be in the Hermite normal form if and only if H is upper triangular and
Every lattice has exactly one basis H in the Hermite normal form. We call the lattices generated by private bases or public bases in Micciancio's GGH cryptosystems Micciancio's GGH lattices. While the private basis is cube-like in the GGH cryptosystem, the private basis is an LLLreduced basis of a basis whose vectors are chosen at random in an n-dimensional c ube in Micciancio's GGH cryptosystem. Thus, compared with GGH lattices, Micciancio's GGH lattices do not have any particular structure. Therefore, Micciancio's GGH lattices are very suitable for estimating the generality of our results.
NTRU Cryptosystem
NTRU lattices underlie the NTRU cryptosystem [10] . The key generation process and the suggested parameters of NTRU have been revised several times. For simplicity, we followed the original description of NTRU in Hoffstein et al. [10] . The private key, ( f, g), and the public key, h, in NTRU are polynomials in polynomial rings, and h is constructed from ( f, g). The encryption function and the decryption function are also based on arithmetic in polynomial rings. However, it was shown that breaking NTRU is related to finding short vectors in a particular class of lattices. In particular, private key ( f, g) was shown to be heuristically equivalent to the shortest nonzero lattice vector in the class of lattices.
Private key ( f, g) can be represented as a 2N-dimensional vec-
where N is the security parameter of NTRU. Public key h can be represented as an N-
n . Consider the following matrix, M h with h:
Next, consider matrix B below with N, an integer, q, which is a power of 2, and M h :
where I is the N-dimensional identity matrix. We call the lattices generated by bases represented by matrix B NTRU lattices. Matrix B above is the simplest form of bases for NTRU lattices. The c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan dimension of NTRU lattices is 2N. Private key ( f, g) is a lattice vector in the NTRU lattice generated by the corresponding public key, h. Hoffstein et al. [10] presented three standard sets of parameters. We will concentrate on the first of (N, q) = (107, 64) in this paper. The level of security yielded by this parameter set is lowest of the three, but no NTRU lattices of N = 107 had ever been broken only by lattice reduction before Gama et al. [6] . Although three NTRU lattices of N = 107 were broken by using BKZ and some improved reduction by Gama et al. [6] , the NTRU lattices of N = 107 can be considered to still be hard for BKZ alone.
Very Short Vector (VSV)
We define a very short vector (VSV) as a lattice vector of the secret key of some lattice-based cryptosystems in this paper. We call v /λ 1 (L) for lattice vector v an approximation factor following Gama et al. [6] , and denote it as ap f a for short. Finding a VSV is equivalent to solving approximate SVP for small γ, which means a VSV is an approximate shortest vector with ap f a ≤ γ. We support this standpoint by referring to Gama et al. [6] where they explained that finding a lattice vector of the secret key of NTRU cryptosystems was equivalent to solving approximate SVP for a suitable γ. It is difficult to determine how small γ is because λ 1 (L) for a lattice, L, is generally not exactly known.
ESS
This section explains the definition of ESS and discusses the performance of search in ESS with the parameters computed from known VSVs.
Definition
We analyzed the distribution of coefficients of VSVs and demonstrated that it is related to some increasing geometric sequence [5] . Here, we recall the results. Let R = [r 1 , . . . , r n ] be a GGH private basis and let B = [b 1 , . . . , b n ] be a (0.99, β)-BKZ reduced GGH public basis. We represent each vector r i of R with the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalized vectors b *
Now, we will investigate the distribution of the Gram-Schmidt coefficients, ν i, j . From the above observation, we defined ESS W k,a, j0,B as follows [5] . Here, we employ a geometric sequence, ka n− j , to bound a search space. Definition 1 Let B be a lattice basis, and let k, a ∈ R + ,
,B is the set of all lattice vectors [5] .
where x rounds x to the closest integer as defined by
, and j 0 = n, the SA search space is a special case of ESS.
We explain the search in ESS in the following. From Definition 1, it can be seen that the forms for the upper bounds of |ν j | of a vector in ESS are z/2 with some z ∈ N. This enables us to efficiently enumerate ESS with GenSample [13] , and in particular
c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan for j = 1, . . . , n. GenSample can be used for the search in W k,a, j0,B . GenSample takes B with μ i, j , some c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ N n and some x ∈ N as input and outputs a lattice vector in the set specified by c . Here, j=1 c j for j 0 such that j 0 is the last index of nonzero c j . We referred to Ludwig [13] for the proof.
Parameters Computed from Known VSVs
We experimentally confirmed that given the parameters computed from known VSVs for ESS, the inclusion ratio of a VSV in ESS is considerably higher than that of the SA search space in our earlier work. VSVs are not known in practical situations. We studied a method of choosing the refined parameters for ESS in situations where there are no known VSVs for a given basis in Section 4.
Experimental Results
The purpose of the search is to find at least one VSV. Therefore, we need to calculate the ratio of the number of bases B such that W k,a, j0,B includes at least one VSV to that of all the bases tested. We tested 100 BKZ-reduced bases on three different types of lattices, i.e., a GGH lattice, Micciancio's GGH lattice, and an NTRU lattice. We used the same set of 100 bases for all parameter sets of (k, a, j 0 ). We calculated the rate for j 0 ∈ {n − 4, n − 3, n − 2, n − 1, n}, k ∈ {1.0, 1.1, 1.2, . . . , 2.0}, and a ∈ {0.8800, 0.8805, 0.8810, · · · , 0.9985, 0.9990}. The two lists in Table 1 summarize the maximum ratio for finding a VSV for a given space size of W k,a, j0,B in GGH lattices in dimension 180. The maximum ratios were computed for all (k, a, j 0 ) tested. We also conducted the same calculation for the SA search space as listed in the lower table. By comparing the upper parts of each table with their corresponding lower parts, we can see that ES S is more effective than the SA search space in finding a VSV. In most cases, the inclusion ratio for the same space size level is much higher for ESS than for the SA search space. Here, we mean any space size 10 r by using space size level 10 z for z = r . Table 2 summarizes the maximum ratio of finding a VSV for a given space size of W k,a, j0,B in Miccinacio's GGH lattices in dimension 160. We have also presented the same calculation for the SA search space listed in the lower part of the table. Table 3 summarizes the maximum ratio of finding a VSV for a given space size of W k,a, j0,B in NTRU lattices in dimension 214. We also presented the same calculation for the SA search space listed in the lower part of the table.
Exhaustive Search with Single CPU
We will present the results obtained from an exhaustive search in ESS for an individual basis in the best case on the three types of lattices to confirm ESS can be exhausted by a single CPU. 
Experimental Results
We reduced a basis in dimension 180 by (0.99, 20)-BKZ. We called the process of reduction before the search preprocessing within the context we used. We then calculated the optimal parameters for ESS from known VSVs in the lattice generated by the basis. Here, the optimal parameters mean those with which W k,a, j0,B includes a VSV and where the space size of W k,a, j0,B is the smallest. We conducted an exhaustive search with the optimal parameters to investigate the potential of the search in ESS.
First, we tested 10 bases in GGH lattices in dimension 180 for the exhaustive search. We reduced each basis with BKZ until the space size of W k,a, j0,B for the basis became small enough for the actual search. Although the space size of W k,a, j0,B for some bases is still large, we could conduct an actual exhaustive search for eight of the 10 bases. The optimal parameter sets and the search time are listed in Table 4 . The "search and preprocessing (sec.)" column indicates the search time and the preprocessing time with BKZ. We used GenSample for the search in W k,a, j0,B .
For comparison, we have also presented the results when only BKZ was used on the eight bases that we conducted the exhaustive search on. We reduced each basis by using BKZ with increasing β. When (0.99, 24)-BKZ reduction terminated, a VSV c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan had been found in two cases. If a VSV was not found, we reduced each basis by using BKZ with β = 25. The total time for BKZ reduction and β with which BKZ reduction had found a VSV is also listed in Table 4 . We can see from the table that the runtime for the search in ESS was much smaller than that for BKZ reduction in all cases. This indicates the potential of the search in ESS. Second, we tested 10 bases in Micciancio's GGH lattices in dimension 160 for the exhaustive search. The optimal parameter sets and the search time are summarized in Table 5 . We found that Micciancio's GGH public bases in dimension 160 were slightly more difficult to reduce by BKZ reduction than GGH public bases in the same dimension 160. However, we could still obtain a VSV from one of the 10 bases. BKZ, on the other hand, could not find a VSV within 10 days for any bases.
Third, we tested 10 bases in NTRU lattices in dimension 214 for the exhaustive search. The optimal parameter sets and the search time are listed in Table 6 . We could also still find a VSV from one of 10 bases. However, BKZ could not find a VSV within 10 days for any bases.
We confirmed from the results above that it was possible to find a VSV by using an exhaustive search with a single CPU in high-dimensional lattices if the parameters were optimal.
Parameter Refinement
We explain how to compute the refined parameters for ESS of a given basis in this section. Here, the refined parameters mean those that maximize the inclusion probability of a VSV under a given space size. Thus, we must compute the inclusion probability of a VSV to refine the parameters. We consider the deviation of a VSV from its expected value on the Gram-Schmidt coefficients as a probabilistic variable to compute the inclusion probability. However, there are no known VSVs for a given basis, and it is difficult to estimate the probabilistic distributions of the variable on which the computation of the inclusion probability is based from the basis alone. Therefore, we utilize other bases where VSVs are known to obtain some probabilistic distributions. This is possible because the key generation algorithms are known in some cryptographic situations. Assuming such cryptographic situations, we introduce a scheme PR that computes the inclusion probability by utilizing many bases besides its input basis and it outputs the parameters for ESS maximizing the inclusion probability in Section 4.2. Some particular distributions are exploited in GGH lattices and NTRU lattices because these types of lattices have some specific structures. We targeted GGH lattices and NTRU lattices to demonstrate the performance of PR, which is discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Compared with GGH lattices and NTRU lattices, Micciancio's GGH lattices do not have any specific structure, and in fact the distributions are dependent on bases. Consequently, the inclusion probability computed with the average distribution is not reliable. For such situations, we consider another approach to refining parameters instead of computing the inclusion probability. Section 4.5 explains how weaker refinement of parameters is possible by using some empirical approaches.
Inclusion Probability Analysis
We utilize the deviation of a VSV from its expected value on the Gram-Schmidt coefficients and that of a basis from GSA to compute the inclusion probability of a VSV. The following analysis is an extended version of that in Fukase and Yamaguchi [4] .
We first consider the expected value of the Gram-Schmidt coefficients of VSVs to describe the deviation of a VSV. Let v = Here, we assume that B has been reduced by LLL or BKZ. Because v is a VSV, each ν j is expected to be small so that ν 
holds for some constant t ∈ R + . Although Assumption 1 does not hold rigorously, it is sufficiently close so that it makes sense to assume that it is true. For example, see Fig. 3 . 
Therefore, it is reasonable to use λ 1 /n 1/2 as t in Eq. (6).
In the following, we represent |ν j | with t and |b * j | for all j = 1, . . . , n as
for a probabilistic variable, t j ∈ R. Now, we consider |ν j | = t/ b * j as the expected value of |ν j | and t j as the deviation of |ν j | from the value. Next, we consider the deviation of a basis from GSA. 
with error terms δ j for j = 1, . . . , n whose absolute values are supposed to be small. Now, we represent |ν j | with the deviations, t j and δ j . From Eqs. (7) and (8):
Here, let k =k, a =ā, and j 0 be parameters for ESS W k,a, j0,B . From Definition 1, Eq. (9), and j = ((1 − e δ j /2 )t + t j )/ (e δ j q j−1 b 1 2 ) 1/2 , the condition below needs to be satisfied for
be the cumulative distribution function of t j . Then, the inclusion probability, p, is:
Sample Bases Approach to Parameter Refinement
The following subsection presents a scheme to compute the refined parameters for ESS, whereby the inclusion probabilities for various sets of parameters for ESS are computed using the formula to compute the inclusion probability in Section 4.1. As stated in Section 4.1, we need the probabilistic distribution of the probabilistic variable, t j , to compute the inclusion probability. Therefore, we use the following information available from bases where VSVs are known. We call such bases training bases.
The cumulative distribution function, p j0, j , of t j is computed on all v = n j=1 ν j b * j such that j 0 is the last index of nonzero coefficient ν j . Note that p j0, j (x) = 0 for x < −t because |ν j | = (t + t j )/ b * j ≥ 0, and p j0, j (∞) = 1. Let p j0 be the fraction of all v in training bases such that j 0 is the last index of nonzero coefficient ν j . Also, let λ 1 be the mean value of v on training bases, and let j 0 be the possible minimum value of the last index, j 0 , of nonzero coefficient ν j .
These inputs are used to calculate the refined values of k, a, and j 0 in the following algorithm PR. 
Parameter Refinement for ESS (PR)
InputP := 0 for z = −d, . . . , 0, . . . , d q := q + αz a := q 1/2 k := t(q 1/2 ) 1−n / b 1 for j = 1, . . . , n δ j := 2 log( b * j ) − 2 log( b 1 ) − ( j − 1) log(q ) for j 0 = j 0 , . . . , n p := p j 0 for j = 1, . . . , j 0 if ( j < j 0 ) p := p p j 0 , j (t j ) else p := p p j 0 , j (t j0 ) P := 1 − (1 − p) n if (P > P and |W k ,a , j 0 ,B | ≤ s) (k, a, j 0 ) := (k , a , j 0 ) P := P
Sample Bases Approach to Parameter Refinement on GGH Lattices
We present the performance of PR on GGH lattices here. GGH lattices have specific structures, and therefore some particular distributions of t j are obtained.
First, we generated 100 (0.99, 20)-BKZ reduced GGH bases as training bases and calculated λ 1 , j 0 , p j0,t j , and p j from them. In this experiment, λ 1 = 69.22 and j 0 = 167.
We computed the refined parameters for the 100 (0.99, 20)-BKZ reduced GGH bases in dimension 180 used in Table 1 with PR. One hundred bases were generated independently of training bases. In PR, q is searched around q, and the candidate set of q s is {q − αd, q − α (d − 1) , . . . , q, . . . , q + α(d − 1), q + αd} with α and d. Note that q differs according to the bases. For example, we obtained q = 0.948 for a basis. With α = 0.0001 and d = 80, the candidate set of q s was {0.940, 0.9401, . . . , 0.9559, 0.956}. For s, we used 10 11 , 10 12 , 10 13 , 10 14 , and 10 15 . Table 7 summarizes the results obtained from the experiment. The "ratio" column in Table 7 indicates the ratios with which at least one VSV was actually included in ESS for the refined parameters. We used the same 100 bases to calculate Tables 1 and 7 . The ratios in Table 1 were calculated by knowing the VSVs. Those in Table 7 , on the other hand, were calculated using the refined pa- rameters. In Table 7 , ratio (PR) ratio (known VSVs) is the goodness of the refined parameters (PR) compared to the parameters computed from known VSVs in Table 1 . "Ratio (PR)" is the ratio of the refined parameters. "Ratio (known VSVs)" represents the parameters computed from known VSVs. For example, the former is 11% in Table 7 , and the latter is 12% in Table 1 . Therefore, ratio (PR) ratio (known VSVs) = 0.92. In Table 7 , ratio (PR) ratio (known VSVs) is high between 10 10 and 10 15 and especially at 10 10 , 10 11 , and 10 15 , it is close to 1.0. Thus, it can be said that the results in Table 7 are close to those in Table 1 . This means that PR performs well.
We also tested some sets of training bases to investigate how many bases were sufficient for training bases. We confirmed that less than 100 bases or bases with weaker reductions were permissible for training bases. However, the results for 10 bases were unstable. Therefore, we considered 10 bases for training bases to be insufficient.
Sample Bases Approach to Parameter Refinement on NTRU Lattices
We introduce the performance of PR on NTRU lattices here. NTRU lattices also have specific structures, and therefore some particular distributions of t j are obtained.
However, we need slight modifications to apply PR to NTRU lattices because b * j 2 for j = 1, . . . , n do not approximate GSA However, we experimentally confirmed that the contribution of the term,
, and (h − 1) to the value of t was small.
Consequently, we replaced (λ
with λ 1 /n 1/2 by just ignoring them. As a result, we have set t to λ 1 /n 1/2 here. We tested the bases where VSVs were known to verify this approximation. In the experiment in dimension 214, we obtained λ = 59.0, 
Let q be the common ratio of a geometric sequence that b * j 2 for j ≥ h approximates, and δ j such that b * j 
Then, in this case, Condition 1 is rewritten into Condition 2 below: Condition 2
We applied modified PR to NTRU lattices in dimension 214. As was discussed in Section 4.3, we experimentally investigated how many bases were sufficient for training bases. We observed that 100 bases were sufficient as training bases and very few bases, e.g., 20 bases, occasionally were not sufficient where PR was applied to NTRU lattices. Subsequently, we used 100 bases as training bases.
Here, we explain our evaluation of the performance of PR on NTRU lattices. First, we generated 100 (0.99, 20)-BKZ reduced NTRU bases as training bases and calculated λ 1 , j 0 , p j0,t j , and p j from them. In this experiment, λ 1 = 7.68 and j 0 = 203. We computed the refined parameters for 100 (0.99, 20)-BKZ reduced NTRU bases in the dimension 214 used in Table 3 with PR. One hundred bases were generated independently of the training bases. We obtained q = 0.949 for some bases. With α = 0.0001 and d = 120, the candidate set of q s was {0. 937 Table 8 summarizes the results obtained from this experiment. The "ratio" column in Table 8 indicates ratios with which at least one VSV was actually included in ESS for the refined parameters. We used the same 100 bases as in Tables 3 and 8 . In Table 8 , ratio (PR) ratio (known VSVs) is the goodness of the refined parameters (PR) compared with the parameters computed from known VSVs in Table 3 . "Ratio (PR)" is the ratio of the refined parameters. "Ratio (known VSVs)" represents the parameters computed from known VSVs. For example, the former is 3% in Table 8 , and the latter is 6% in Table 3 . Therefore, ratio (PR) ratio (known VSVs) = 0.50.
From 8, ratio (PR) ratio (known VSVs)
is more than 1.00 in some cases. This means that at some space size levels, PR achieved higher ratios than those for the experiment listed in Table 3 . This was possible because parameters were individually determined for each input basis with PR while the parameters computed from known VSVs were applied equally to all targeted bases. Thus, PR performed well.
Empirical Approach to Parameter Refinement
Micciancio's GGH lattices do not have any specific structure, and the distributions are dependent on bases. Because the average distribution on many bases concerning Micciancio's GGH lattices is useless for computing the inclusion probability, PR cannot be applied to Micciancio's GGH lattices. Even in such cases, it is possible to refine parameters with some empirical approach because there are not that many candidates for a proper parameter set in practice. As we saw in Section 4.4, the parameters refined by PR are sometimes better than the parameters computed from known VSVs. However, the parameters computed with parameter refinement presented here can never be better than the parameters computed from known VSVs. In that sense, the parameter refinement presented here is weaker. First, consider the choice of j 0 . See Fig. 4 . Figure 4 plots the inclusion ratios for the 100 bases at several levels of space size for j 0 = 158, j 0 = 159, and j 0 = 160. The k in the figure is fixed at 2.0, and it can be seen that the inclusion ratios for j 0 = n are much higher than those for j 0 smaller than n.
Second, consider the choice of k. Figure 5 plots the inclusion ratios for the 100 Micciancio's GGH bases used in Table 2 at several levels of space size for k = 1.0, k = 1.5, and k = 2.0. The j 0 in the figure is fixed at 160. The inclusion ratios in Table 2 , which were achieved when VSVs were known, have been shown for comparison. As seen in Fig. 5 , k = 1.0 achieves much lower inclusion ratios than other ks, while any k > 1.0 achieves similarly high inclusion ratios. Hence, k = 1.0 should be avoided.
From the above observation, one can set j 0 to n and k to 2.0. Then, a is determined by a given space size with j 0 = n and k = 2.0. In summary, the parameter refinement here, which we call empirical refinement, is as follows: Empirical Refinement ( 1 ) set j 0 to n ( 2 ) set k to 2.0 ( 3 ) compute a from given space size with j 0 and k We concluded that a proper parameter set, which is only a little worse than the parameter set computed from known VSVs, could be determined by using empirical refinement. We confirmed empirical refinement could also be applied to GGH lattices and NTRU lattices when training bases were not available.
Exhaustive Search with Multiple CPUs
This section introduces a method of distributed search and presents the results obtained from the distributed search in ESS on eight CPUs.
Because sampling reduction does not manipulate the basis during the sampling phase at all, it is subject to easy distribution. Ludwig proposed a method of parallelizing sampling reduction by running GenSample again and again on each CPU, and he estimated how effective the method was [13] . Here, we confirm how effective the method in ESS is with an actual search.
We need to employ many CPUs to conduct a distributed search in ESS. Suppose there are z CPUs available. As explained in Sec- − 1) , . . . , N − 1} have a one-to-one correspondence via GenSample for j = z. Then, we run GenSample for W j on the j-th CPU for j = 1, . . . , z. We can expect that the distributed search in ESS will reduce the search time by at least z.
We conducted small scale experiments on a distributed search in ESS. We used eight CPUs. We conducted the distributed search in ESS on three types of lattices as described in Section 3. We used the same bases and corresponding optimal parameters as in Section 3. The results are summarized in Tables 9, 10 , and 11, where the search time does not include the preprocessing time with BKZ.
In most cases, the distributed search in ESS reduced the search time by a factor that was much larger than z. This phenomenon is strange because we expected that the search time would be reduced by factor z on average. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is as follows. We partitioned the search space into disjunct parts W k,a, j0,B = ∪ 8 j=1 W j in the experiments. We confirmed that in many cases a VSV existed in W j with a relatively large j. This seemed to be caused by the parameters selected for ESS. We chose parameters with which W k,a, j0,B included a VSV and the space size of W k,a, j0,B was the smallest. A VSV for such parameters possibly fell in near the end of W k,a, j0,B . Furthermore, we assumed that a VSV would accidentally fall in near the start of some W j in the experiments. 
Conclusion
We enabled parameter refinement for ESS and confirmed the distributed search in ESS was effective by achieving significant speedups. The phenomenon we observed in Section 5 may be exploited to improve our method of search. We found that in some cases the search time was reduced by a factor that was larger than 1,000 on only eight CPUs. Such significant speedups might be caused on purpose by inventing some proper order for the search rather than just forward or backward searches. This direction of research may offer further suggestions to advance studies on exhaustive search. 
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